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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
REPLY BRIEF 
Plaint iff/Respondent, : OF APPELLANTS 
v* 
GEORGE RAY NEELEY and 
LYNN L. BELT, : Case Nos. 20694 and 20710 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is little dispute in the facts of this case. 
It bears repeating, however, that respondent confesses that the 
trial court erred in the sentence imposed for the crime of 
Criminal Trespass, an infraction. The court imposed a sentence 
of three months imprisonment, (R. 218-285) to run concurrently 
with the terms of imprisonment for Burglary (0-5 years) and 
Theft (1-15 years). (See Respondent' ~ Brief at D 2, fn. 1) 
Appellants agree with respondent that the trial court exceeded 
its authority and the judgment should be modified accordingly. 
POINT I 
REVERSIBLE ERROR DID OCCUR WHEN THE TRIAL 
JUDGE REFUSED TO RECUSE HIMSELF. 
Respondent concedes that both appellants are "on 
equal footing" to advance the argument that the trial judge 
should have recused himself, that error to recuse would inure 
to the detriment of both appellants, and that the motion to 
disqualify Judge Banks was timely filed. (Respondent Brief, 
p. 7) 
Respondent also notes that this court "has suggested 
that it would ordinarily be a better practice for a judqe to 
disqualify himself or herself upon the filing of an affidavit 
of bias or prejudice, even though the judqe may be entirely 
free of those detractors,../. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7) 1 
Respondent then argues that the majority view in this 
country is that recusal is not required "when the judqe was 
involved as a prosecutor in a previous unrelated prosecution of 
the same defendant." (Respondent's Brief, p. 7-8) 
What is the majority or minority view on a legal 
issue is often open to question. What is clear from a careful 
reading of the cases cited by the parties however, is that the 
cognizable trend is toward acceptance of a rule that any 
appearance of impartiality by the trial judge mandate's recusal. 
This trend is best exemplified by the very recent case of 
Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1986). In 
Bradshaw, the court granted Federal Habeas Corpus relief to a 
state prisoner finding that the petitioner was not required to 
show prejudice from the fact that one judge sitting on a state 
appellate tribunal had been the state's prosecuting attorney at 
the time of petitioner's prosecution and that his name had ap-
peared on the states brief solely as a matter of protocal and 
1. It is interesting to note that the suggestions of this 
court have not always been heeded by the trial bench in the 
State of Utah. See State v. Long, 36 U.A.R. 11, 14, P.2d 
(1986) . 
courtesy. The Fifth Circuit, in granting the petition, stated: 
A fair tribunal requires not only an absence 
of actual bias...(b)ut to perform its high 
function in the best way justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice. (Cita-
tions omitted) A defendant's right to an 
impartial tribunal is violated when a judge 
deciding his case may have a direct interest 
against him. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 441, 71 L.Ed. 749 
(1927) . 
Whether or not Vollers actually participated 
in Bradshaw's prosecution must be found to 
be immaterial. The appearance of Vollers1 
name on the prosecuting attorney's brief 
undermined a fundamental aspect of our 
criminal justice system: a judge's 
neutrality. The separation between the 
roles of prosecutor and judge must be 
certain and inflexible. (Citations omitted) 
We can only conclude that Bradshaw had 
valid reason to feel that his appeal was 
being decided by a judge who played a part 
in his prosecution. 
The court citing to the need for the appearance of 
fairness states: 
Finally, in the eyes of the public the 
impartiality of justice is shattered. 
There can be no footnote explanation 
accompanying every possible instance where 
the public might discover that the same 
person is listed as a prosecutor and later 
as a judge in the same case. We find that 
Vollers should have disqualified himself in 
this case. 
There is no need to show prejudice. The 
overt facts of this case show that the 
probability of prejudice on the part of 
the judge...is too high to be constitution-
ally tolerable. (Citations omitted) 
Inasmuch as Judge Vollers' situation went 
to the very core of our judicial system's 
integrity, it cannot be considered harmless. 
(Citations omitted) 
The same lack of an appearance of fairness is clear 
in the instant case when the trial judge actually made appearances 
at a prior criminal trial of one of the appellants. The logic 
of Bradshaw is irrefutable. Likewise, respondent cannot claim 
that other judges were not available, since the Third Judicial 
District Court encompasses not only the largest population base 
in the State of Utah, but also has the largest number of trial 
judges.2 
Appellants respectfully submit the failure to recuse 
Judge Banks denied them Due Process of Law and Equal Protection 
of the Laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah as well as the statutes and rules of court 
heretofore cited. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S ARE ENTITLED TO REVERSALS OF 
THEIR CONVICTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT THEY 
WERE NOT PROVIDED A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF 
THEIR PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Respondent concedes that appellants were entitled to 
a complete preliminary hearing transcript, but argues that 
demonstrable prejudice must be shown before a reversal is re-
quired in the instant case. Again, although there is a diver-
2. As noted in Appellant's Brief, p. 3, Judge Fishier seemed 
to accept this when he stated: 
My thinking would be if I could check around 
the district court and see if we could find 
a judge who could just trade calendars with 
Judge Banks. (R. 901) 
gence in authority, the better rule as stated in appellant's 
brief is that actual prejudice need not be shown. This rule is 
also of statutory origin in the State of Utah. 
The Rules of Practice in the distict courts and 
circuit courts of the State of Utah provide comprehensive 
guidelines for the record of proceedings in the circuit court. 
See Rules 6.1 - 6.6. 
Prior to the enactment of the Circuit Court Act in the 
State of Utahf the city courts and justice of the peace courts, 
which handled much of the business which now falls within the 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, were not courts of record. 
When making the circuit court a court of record and allowing 
the use of electronic recording equipment as an alternative to 
court transcribers, (see Rule 6.2) there was concern for the 
fallibility of the devices to be employed and their operators. 
Rule 6.5 was enacted, which provides: 
The failure of the electronic recording 
equipment to record properly because of 
mechanical failure or error in operation 
thereof by the operator in a court proceeding 
shall be grounds for the granting of a new 
trial except in those cases where the 
portion of the verbatim record not recorded 
is insignificant to the issues in the matter 
before the court or would not affect the 
possible points of appeal. 
The portion of the preliminary hearing which was lost 
covered portions of an extensive and wide ranging cross-
examination of the state's chief witness against appellants. 
The credibility of that witness, Bittner, was conceded by both 
sides to be the issue at trial. During the preliminary hearing, 
Bittner conceded that he had committed perjury at a previous 
point in his examination, forcing the court to suspend the 
examination and appoint counsel for him. It simply cannot be 
concluded that this cross-examination was "insignificant". It 
is reasonable to assume that a man who had demonstrated a 
willingness to lie on the witness stand once, might lie again. 
It has been said that cross-examintion of a witness is "the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.3 
And Chief Justice Berger has stated that questioning witnesses 
is a valuable weapon in ascertaining the truth, particularly 
when that weapon is in the hands of a skilled examiner: 
It is the responsibility of the lawyer to 
probe; testimonial interrogation, and cross-
examination in particular, is a probing, 
prying, pressing form of inquiry. If a 
witness evades, it is the lawyer's 
responsibility to recognize the evasion and 
to bring the witness back to the mark, to 
flush out the whole truth with the tools of 
adversary examination.4 
Any experienced criminal lawyer knows that the vast 
majority of cases are determined by the answers and the demeanor 
of witnesses who testify before the trier of fact. Factfinders 
observing a live witness determine whether or not the witness 
is honestly relating the facts, inadvertently misstating them, 
or intentionally lying. 
In this case one of the most effective uses of cross-
3. This statement is attributed to Professor Wigmore. Ladd & 
Carlson, Cases and Materials on Evidence, (1972) at 125. 
4. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973). 
c 
examination, impeachment by prior-inconsistant statement, is 
lost to the accused by the failure of the recording equipment. 
Surely, the result is no different than havinq no transcript at 
all, which required the reversal of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1955). 
POINT III 
BECAUSE APPELLANTS DID REQUEST A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL 
TRESPASS FOR THE BURGLARY CHARGE, THEY 
CAN ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
REFUSED TO GIVE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION; 
IN ADDITION, APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO 
THAT INSTRUCTION. 
Respondent argues that appellants failed to request a 
criminal trespass lesser included offense instruction of the 
alleged burglary which occurred on April 11, 1983. It is 
conceded that the trial court gave lesser included instructions 
for criminal trespass (Infraction) for the charged criminal 
trespass (Class C Misdemeanor) which occurred on March 20, 
1983. (Respondent's Brief, p. 11) In fact, appellants were 
convicted of this lesser and included offense. It is true that 
the colloquy between the court and counsel is somewhat confusinq 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 11) That is at least in part due to the 
trial court's submission of the lesser included offense instruc-
tion on criminal trespass (Class C Misdemeanor) but its failure 
to do so on the burglary. The totality of the colloquy between 
counsel and the court on this point is as follows: 
Mr. Yengich: I would take exception to the 
court's failure to give my instruction, my 
directed verdict instruction on Criminal 
Trespass, Burglary and Theft, which are 18, 
19 and 20, for the reasons previously ar-
gued in that there is not sufficient evidence 
to send those to the jury* 
I would except to the court's failure to 
give my instruction on reasonable alterna-
tive hypothesis, at least in the Criminal 
Trespass case. That is a circumstantial 
case at best, and that instruction is ap-
propriate in this case. I would also argue 
it is proper in the other two counts. 
I except to the court's failure to give my 
instruction on lesser included offenses. 
This is 5, 6, 7, and 8, lesser included 
instruction on criminal trespass, an infrac-
tion on the burglary count. I do not know 
how we can have criminal trespass on the 
19th and not legitimately give an instruc-
tion to that effect on the 20th. 
The court: You mean for April 11th? 
Mr. Yengich: I am sorry, April the 11th, 
thank you, Judge. 
The court: I don't know whether you said 
you had a requested instruction. How did I 
mark those? 
Mr. Yengich: You marked them "not given". 
The court: I would deny the trespass on 
the Burglary and Theft. I didn't on the 
Class C. (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Yengich: Okay. Just so we are clear. 
There was some confusion as to the dates, 
okay. 
The court: Just so the record is clear... 
(Emphasis added) 
Mr. Brown: Defendant's requested instruc-
tion no. 9, that was intended to be a 
lesser included offense having to do with 
the burglary, the alleged burglary, on 
April the 11th, 1983, and the court has 
indicated that you would not give the 
lesser included on that. 
The court: On Burglary and Theft for the 
infraction? 
Mr. Brown: Pardon? 
The court: The infraction instruction on 
Burglary and Theft? 
Mr. Brown: No, the Criminal Trespass on 
the 11th of April. 
The court: Yes. 
Mr. Brown: Then my instruction reads, "on 
the 20th of March," and I amend that to the 
"llth of April, 1983." That's the requested 
lesser included on the lesser included 
burglary. By error we put it the 20th of 
March instead of the 11th of April. 
The court: I marked those at the time, and 
I advised you of them. 
Mr. Brown: You indicated that you did not 
feel a lesser included — 
The court: I marked the ones as they were, 
but I wouldn't have given a Criminal Trespass 
on the Burglary and Theft. 
Mr. Brown: On April the 11th? 
The court: I would not have given one of 
those, either Burglary or Theft. 
Mr. Brown: Instruction No. 11 is the 
directed verdict request, and Instruction 
No. 12 is a directed verdict request and 
also No. 13. All three of these the court 
denied. I would take my exceptions to 
those. 
Mr. Yengich's requested instruction concern-
ing the corroboration of an accomplice, I 
also—I didn't request that, but I have 
indicated that that would be my request 
also, that I felt that the corroboration of 
an accomplice instruction was appropriate. 
And I adopt that as my request also. 
Mr. Yengich: Your honor, I would join in 
Mr. Brown's exceptions. Mr. Shepherd and I 
have discussed it. We will prepare — I 
will prepare one that our lesser includeds 
on the Burglary say the 20th of March 
instead of the 11th of April. I will 
prepare new ones for the record so we have 
a complete record, if that is okay with the 
court. Mr. Shepherd has no objection to 
that. 
The court: Wellf I indicated to you verbally 
that I didn't know that you had requested 
that. But you did state that you did. 
Mr. Yengich: Yes. 
The court: In looking at your instructions 
or your requested instructions, I couldn't 
glean that from that, but it was discussed. 
And I indicated I would not include it on 
those. 
As to 21, the language in there that is 
really objectionable is that it has to be 
viewed with caution. All of the instruc-
tions taken as a whole as to credibility of 
the witnesses cover the rest of that in-
struction, as the court views it. 
Anything else? 
Mr. Yengich: Nothing further. 
Respondent argues that appellants' "appeared to object 
to the courts failure to give a lesser included instruction on 
Criminal Trespass charge", (Respondent's Brief at p. 11); 
however, the record makes clear that such an exception was 
properly taken. 
POINT IV 
THE TPIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION REGARDING ACCOMP-
LICE TESTIMONY. 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7 (1982) requires the 
giving of a cautionary instruction if the testimony of an 
i n 
accomplice is self contradictory, uncertain, or improbable. In 
this case, the prosecution based almost all of its case on the 
testimony of accomplice David Bittner, an admitted liar. 
Bittner perjured himself during the preliminary hearing (R. 
405), demonstrating his willingness to lie under oath when he 
thought it necessary to gain an advantage, detroying his 
credibility as a witness. The state contends that Bittner's 
inconsistent testimony "merely indicated differences between 
prior and present testimony." (Respondent's Brief, p. 14) 
The difference, however, is the difference between truth and 
falsity. 
In general, accomplice testimony should be viewed 
with caution and distrust. As early as 1909, the United States 
Supreme Court observed that accomplice testimony "ought to be 
received with suspicion and with the greatest care and caution 
and ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same 
rules governing other and apparently credible witnesses." 
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909). The 
Supreme Court explained that: 
Common sense would suggest that he (the 
accomplice) often has a greater interest in 
lying in favor of the prosecution rather 
than against it, especially if he is awaiting 
his own trial or sentencinq. To think that 
criminals will lie to save their fellows 
but not to obtain favors from the prosecution 
for themselves is indeed to clothe the 
criminal class with more nobility than one 
might expect to find in the public at large. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
We recognize that an accomplice may be 
motivated to falsify because of a desire to 
blame someone else in connection with the 
crime; or in the hope of obtaining leniency; 
or in the very fact that he is involved 
with crime may intend to impair his 
credibility. These combine to justify 
looking upon his testimony with caution... 
State v. Sinclair, 389 P.2d 465 (Utah 1964). 
In the instant case, the accomplice, David Bittner, was to be 
paid by the police both before and after his testimony against 
the defendants was given (R. 573-575). He was also granted 
immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. 
Some surrounding jurisdictions have found accomplice 
testimony so inherently suspect as to require the giving of an 
instruction if the conviction was substantially obtained through 
the use of accomplice testimony. See Anthony v. State, 512 
P.2d 486 (Alaska 1974); Price v. State, 647 P.2d 611 (Alaska 
App. 1982). The State of Washington has found that because of 
the strong self interest of the accomplice "it is always the 
better practice for a trial court to give the cautionary 
instruction whenever accomplice testimony is introduced." 
State v. Harris, 685 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1984). 
Many federal courts require that juries be cautioned 
regarding accomplice testimony. The Tenth Circuit has held 
that even though an accomplice is capable of being a competent 
and truthful witness and that a conviction may be based upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if believed by a 
jury, "the rule is established in this circuit, however, that 
testimony of accomplices must be carefully scrutinizedr weighed 
with great care and received with caution." United States v. 
Birmingham, 444 F.2d 1313f 1317 (19th Cir. 1971). See also, 
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972). 
The present case raised more than the inherent 
general suspicion of accomplice credibility. In this case, the 
accomplice destroyed whatever credibility he had by lying under 
oath about receiving money from the police. His willingness to 
lie under oath, especially concerning his role as a testifying 
accomplice, renders all of his testimony suspect and uncertain. 
Where the accomplice is an admitted perjurer, and especially 
where the prosecution has based its case almost exclusively 
upon the accomplice's testimony, reason, fairness and justice 
demand that the jury be cautioned regarding such testimony. 
The state contends that Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7 
only requires the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction 
where "self contradictory, uncertain or improbable accomplice 
testimony is uncorroborated. The appellant contends that this 
is far too restrictive an interpretation. A proper reading of 
the statute requires the trial judge to give the instruction if 
the testimony of the accomplice is "self contradictory, uncertain 
or improbable," whether or not it is corroborated. 
The statute reads as follows: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the un-
corroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an 
instruction to the jury may be given to the 
effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an 
instruction shall be given if the trial 
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice 
to be self contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable. (emphasis added) 
Section 2 of the statute is divided into two distinct 
clauses. The first allows the trial court the discretion to 
give the instruction if the testimony is uncorroborated. 
However, the use of the word "shall" in the second clause 
requires the giving of the instruction if the testimony is self 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable. If the testimony of 
the accomplice is inherently self contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable, even evidence which tends to be corroborative cannot 
lend it sufficient credibility to outweigh the need for a 
cautionary instruction. 
However, even if the state's interpretation is 
accepted, the prosecution did not present sufficient corrobora-
tion in this case to overcome the prejudicial effect of omitting 
the cautionary instruction. In other jurisdictions, whether 
failure to give the cautionary instruction is reversible error 
depends upon the extent of corroboration. State v. Harris, 685 
P.2d 584 (Wash. 1984). See also State v. Moore, 622 P.2d 631 
(Kan. 1981). 
In Utah, the rule is that the corroborating evidence 
must connect the defendant with the commission of the offense 
and be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his 
innocence and that the evidence must do more than cast a grave 
suspicion on the defendant. Further, the corroboration must do 
all of these things without the aid of the testimony of the 
accomplice. State v. Vigil, 260 P.2d 539 (Utah 1953). See 
also State v. Jones, 656 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, the only evidence connecting the 
defendants to the crimes of burglary and theft was the testimony 
of the accomplice, David Bittner. The testimony of the owner, 
receptionist and police officers did not provide sufficient 
corroborating evidence to outweigh the need for a cautionary 
instructions. The owner testified that Bittner came to him 
claiming the appellants were going to burglarize his business, 
at which point, relying upon Bittner1s word, he contacted the 
police. (R. 520) The receptionist only testified that she 
found that things on her desk had been "dislocated" around 
March 20. (R. 494-495) No evidence was presented that could 
possibly convict the defendants of burglary and theft. The 
police officers, relying solely upon the word of David Bittner, 
testified to setting up a sting operation with Bittner and the 
business owner. (R. 549-551) They testified to observing 
Bittner and appellants enter the building through the door. (P. 
555) They testified to observing Bittner and appellants exit 
the building after approximately one hour inside. (R. 556-557) 
They testified that they found items moved from one place to 
another within the building. (R. 603-604) None of this 
testimony is inconsistent with the explanation given by appel-
lants. (R. 719-736) The only evidence that appellants were 
engaged in the crimes of burglary and theft was the testimony 
of David Bittner, an accomplice and admitted perjurer. The 
prosecution based nearly its entire case upon Bittner's testi-
mony. 
The appellants are not arguing that the instruction 
should have been given "simply because Bittner's story was 
different from defendants"• (Respondent's Brief, p. 14) Bittner's 
admission of previous perjury cast serious doubt upon his 
credibility as a witness. (R. 405) Given this fact, the 
insufficiency of corroborating evidence and the inherent suspi-
cion of accomplice testimony in general, the trial court's 
refusal to give the requested instruction on accomplice testimony 
was reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants respectfully submit that their convic-
tions should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this / y day of August, 
1986. 
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APPENDIX 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss . 
County of Salt Lake : 
GLENN K. IWASAKI, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah, 
2. That on June 1, 1983, I received a telephone call from 
the clerk of Judge Eleanor S. Lewis (now VanSciver) at approxi-
mately 1:50 p.m., during which I was informed that Judge Lewis 
requested my assistance with a witness who had testified at a Pre-
liminary Hearing earlier in the morning to advise him as to the 
possible ramifications of perjured and/or inconsistent statements. 
3. I arrived at the Circuit Court a little after 2:00 p.m. 
and met with DAVID JOSEPH BITTNER and discussed with him the 
events of the day. 
4. After conversation with Mr. Bittner, Ronald Yengich, 
defense counsel, and Richard S. Shepherd, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney, it became evident that Mr. Bittner had made contradic-
tory answers to the same questions proposed by Mr. Yengich. 
5. Judge Eleanor S. Lewis (VanSciver) was concerned about 
the possibility of perjury and requested my assistance in sorting 
out the events. 
6. While it appeared that Mr. Bittner did in fact make con-
flicting statements in his testimony, the position of Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney Richard Shepherd was that Mr. Bittner had 
changed his answer and had explained his previous inconsistency 
pursuant to further examination both on cross and redirect. 
7. That based upon his complete testimony, no further action 
against Mr. Bittner was pursued by the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office. 
DATED this \i u day of August, ia 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me th is£M-day of August, 1986. 
My commission expires: 
June 19, 1988 
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